C an nature lie? This question weighed upon the parson-naturalist Charles Kingsley in 1857 as he read with horror a new book by his friend Philip Henry Gosse. Gosse's Omphalos argued that the Earth's record of changing species was an illusion caused by fossils and strata appearing ready-made in the beginning. "Each organism," Gosse wrote, "was from the first marked with the records of a previous being. But since creation and previous history are inconsistent with each other . . . it follows, that such records are false " (336). Kingsley had earlier praised and even emulated Gosse's work, which framed nature studies as a form of religious worship. Omphalos, however, dismayed Kingsley. In an 1857 letter to Gosse, he confided:
For twenty-five years, I have read no book which has so staggered and puzzled me.
. . . Your book tends to prove this-that if we accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes a Deus quidam deceptor. . . . You make God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here; which makes me say, "Come what will, disbelieve what I may, I cannot believe this of a God of truth, of Him who is Light and no ABSTRACT: Charles Kingsley's natural theology hinged upon his faith in nature's "truthfulness." He conceptualized nature as a divine text that both exemplified truthfulness and preached it symbolically. However, this view was undermined as modern science increasingly revealed ruthless deception and parasitism throughout the organic world. Faced with such seemingly amoral facts, Kingsley often located divine truthfulness less in nature itself than in the naturalist studying it. Yet moralizing scientific habits in this way would ultimately undermine Kingsley's argument for moral meaning in the natural world. His efforts to conflate moral and factual truth were bound up with his struggle to defend his authority as an interpreter of nature as emerging secular science threatened to both usurp and invalidate this authority.
WILL ABBERLEY (W.abberley@sussex.ac.uk) completed a PhD in English at the University of Exeter in 2012. His monograph, English Fiction and the Evolution of Language, 1850 Language, -1914 , was published by Cambridge University Press in 2015. He is currently a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow at the University of Sussex, pursuing a research project on concepts of biological mimicry and disguise in Victorian culture. Kingsley 's model of nature as a paragon and preacher of veracity was undermined, however, by growing evidence that many species survived by parasitism and ruthless deception. Jacques Derrida has noted a long-running tendency in western philosophy to see lying as one of the fundamental barriers between humans and animals (129-36). However, Kingsley was concerned less with animals' mental capacities than with their symbolic function. Why would a truth-loving God create animal camouflage and disguises? John Hawley argues that while Kingsley always publicly insisted on nature's divine legibility, in his later years he privately "increasingly turned to the 'book' of nature as one might view a Rorschach blot: as a suggestive invitation to discern meaning" (479). Nonetheless, Kingsley never gave up his search for moral meaning in nature, since its presumed existence was fundamental to his authority as a parson-naturalist devoted to interpreting nature and scripture side by side. He sometimes downplayed nature's deceits by moralizing the practices of science, which he imagined as a providential expression of divine truthfulness. However, this strategy framed nature as contrastingly amoral. After Kingsley's death, scientific naturalists would follow this point to its conclusion, representing ethics not as natural or transcendent but as artificial and, perhaps, relative. Resisting these implications, Kingsley inconsistently clung to the idea of innate moral symbolism in nature, however cryptic. In his vision, moral truth vacillated between an objective natural fact and a human projection.
Natural Truthfulness
Kingsley's belief in nature's truthfulness followed from his fixation with sincerity. Protestant tradition had idealized sincerity as a virtue that collapsed the distinction between inner conscience and outward speech.
3 To be true, in the sincere sense, was to be not merely honorable, reliable, or correct, but also to be transparent. Kingsley often failed to embody this ideal himself, as he hid his private spiritual struggles behind a bullish public voice. Yet the goal of sincerity remained central to his thought. As an upper-class, Cambridge-educated rector, he sacrificed promotion to speak out in favour of controversial causes such as Christian Socialism. "I will not be a liar," he wrote to his wife Fanny in 1848 when encouraged to distance himself from the movement: "I will speak in season and out of season. I will not shun to declare the whole counsel of God" (1:178). In 1856, he wrote to Gosse of his loathing for Catholicism's "outward observances, and mere stage-acting in the house of God" (1:413). His public dispute with John Henry Newman in the 1860s stemmed from Kingsley's contention that the Catholic author had encouraged priests to lie. His reverence for truth sometimes even made him regret writing fiction, as in an 1857 letter to the critic George Brimley, he derided the activity as "a farce and a sham" (2:44). 4 The novelist was perhaps not so different from the animal imposter clothed in false colors. Kingsley imagined God as the origin of veracity, exemplifying it to humankind in his words and works. In an early lecture "On English Composition" (1848), he claimed that God intended language to serve not the concealment but "the expression of thought" (230). All literature expressed "the character of the writer's mind and heart," Kingsley argued, since, "Expression is literally the pressing out into palpable form that which is already within us" (230-31). Kingsley would transpose this notion of the text as a materialization of its author's mind onto nature. A keen naturalist from his youth, Kingsley had grown up with the traditional idea that nature was a book of moral symbols, from the cunning fox to the industrious bee. Animal bodies might be imagined as similarly transparent, as Kingsley's friend John Ruskin showed when contrasting them with "deceptive" modern architecture. "That building will generally be the noblest," he wrote, "which to an intelligent eye discovers the great secrets of its structure, as an animal form does, although from a careless observer they may be concealed" (80). Nature seemed to parallel the Bible as the source and standard of truthfulness. However, such rhetoric masked a long-growing uncertainty about nature's capacity to convey moral truths. While science had discovered natural laws that were empirically verifiable, their possible symbolic meanings were, like those of the Bible, open to popular interpretation and questioning. Deism had shown how ambiguous nature could be when read independently of scripture. Thomas Paine implied nature favored republican democracy and rejected artificial aristocracy (21). Conversely, David Hume noted that if nature did proclaim a creator, its gratuitous violence and suffering hardly suggested a moral one (133-34). Such dangerous deism and skepticism caused evangelicals to stress the primacy of scripture and the moral inscrutability of nature.
6 These problems had likewise prompted the influential natural theologian William Paley to emphasize practical evidence of design over less certain moral symbolism. Paley concluded that nature testified to a creator through its ingenious adaptations, which maximized happiness. Kingsley was immersed in Paley's work as an undergraduate and described him, in later years, as one of the "greatest natural theologians" ("Natural Theology of the Future" 315). However, Paley's utilitarian effort to calculate the world's goodness undermined the claim that it taught goodness. As naturalists followed Paley's lead, studying organisms' adaptions to their environments, examples multiplied of creatures surviving not through superior strength or skills but rather through deceptive camouflage and parasitism . 7 Gosse commented: "A very vast amount of the energy of animal life is spent either in making war, or in resisting or evading it. . . . Various are the arts and devices, the tricks and stratagems . . . employed in that earnest strife which never knows a suspension of hostilities" (Evenings 407). As evidence mounted for species extinction, nature seemed not only to reward deceit but also to consign the honest to oblivion. These influences suffused mid-century English nature writing with a profound ambivalence about the moral significance of its objects. Scholars have described this gradual shift in nature writing from a "narrative of natural theology" to a "narrative of natural history" that avoided theological questions. 8 If Nature spoke, it perhaps spoke only of its own internal workings. Kingsley would downplay this designification of nature by moralizing and spiritualizing the practices of science, framing them as providential developments that showed God's love of truth. This logic resembled the Cambridge geologist Adam Sedgwick's claim in his Discourse on the Studies of the University (1833) that despite seeming to undermine scripture, science actually confirmed it. Inductive research, he argued, embodied the Christian values of humility, patience, and self-abnegation in the search for truth . In his book of seaside studies Glaucus: Wonders of the Shore (1854-55), Kingsley praised Sedgwick for having thus "wielded in defence of Christianity the very science . . . expected to subvert it" (14). However, this moralizing and spiritualizing of scientific habits rendered the legibility of nature uncertain. In 1845, Sedgwick argued that nature's consistent laws embodied the divine virtue of truthfulness, since moral and material nature came from "one creative mind" (56). Yet Sedgwick also stressed the separateness of the moral and material. Fearing evolutionary theory would reduce morality to an outgrowth of the physical, he argued that the human intellect "ennobled" material nature (56), projecting moral analogies onto matter that remained in itself amoral. Although Kingsley would disagree with Sedgwick about evolution, he echoed the geologist's ambivalence about the moral legibility of nature. In Glaucus and his evolutionary fairy tale The Water-Babies (1862-63), he presented science and technology as providential realizations of a divine truthfulness that humankind imposed upon nature rather than discovered there. However, these texts also clung to the notion that nature possessed some moral significance in itself: preaching honesty, diligence, and cooperation, and condemning liars and parasites through physical degeneration. Later in his career, Kingsley seemed to accept the division of moral and material truth at least superficially, as he distinguished science and theology by their respective concerns for "the How" and "the Why" ("The Natural Theology" 329). Yet this division also maintained the overlap between the material and the moral, presenting them as opposite ends of a spectrum instead of as fundamentally separate entities. Kingsley's insistence that nature had a "Why" protected the authority of parson-naturalists like him to interpret it as a text of divine moral symbols. Kingsley often conjured the concept of Deus quidam deceptor (God who is sometimes a deceiver) in order to forcefully deny it. Yet his real struggle was less against the specter of a deceitful creator than with the idea that lying as a moral concept had no salience in nature.
Unnatural Theology
Kingsley first made his name as a parson-naturalist with Glaucus, which he first published as an article and then expanded into a book. Following the controversies surrounding Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859), Kingsley tried to reconcile evolution with religion in The WaterBabies. Glaucus reveals his first uncertainties about nature's supposed truthfulness, as he observes organisms surviving through tricks and parasitism. Hence, the text frequently locates divine truthfulness in the habits of naturalists, conceptualizing the world as a kind of trial that humans overcome through scientific honesty and objectivity. Kingsley imagines this process further in The Water-Babies, suggesting that, through science, humans are destined not only to transcend nature's deceits but also to remove them, imposing truthfulness on nature.
The rhetoric of Glaucus often presents nature as morally significant and improving. "How easily a man might, if he would, wash his soul clean," Kingsley writes, "by going out to be alone a while with God in heaven, and with that earth which He has given to the children of men . . . as a witness and a sacrament that in Him they live and move" (221-22). Nature seems to reveal its creator just as Kingsley imagined books expressing the characters of their authors. The beaches and rock pools, he writes, display "the finger-mark of God" (16). Amy M. King notes that the popular genre of seaside-study book followed the novelistic logic of discovering general truths by scrutinizing tiny particulars (159-62). Kingsley frames his narrative in this way, instructing the reader "to see grandeur in the minutest objects . . . estimating each thing not carnally . . . by its size or its pleasantness to the senses, but spiritually, by the amount of Divine thought revealed to him therein" (45). Christopher Hamlin observes that Kingsley perceived a divine moral in crabs tidying the sea floor, so exemplifying duty and social responsibility ("Charles Kingsley" 269). "All the invaluable laws and methods of sanitary reform," Kingsley writes, "at best are but clumsy imitations of the unseen wonders which every animalcule and leaf has been working since the world's foundation; with this slight difference between them and us, that they fulfil their appointed task, and we do not" (175). Nature appears a righteous foil to "the carelessness, and laziness, and greed of sinful man," preaching morals to humans wise enough to listen (174). Kingsley continues, "The sickly geranium which spreads its blanched leaves against the cellar panes . . . had it a voice, could tell more truly than ever a doctor in the town, why little Bessy sickened of the scarlatina, and little Johnny of the hooping-cough" (175). The crab's scavenging offers a morality play, as the narrator states: "The evil was there,-and there it should not stay; so having neither cart nor barrow, he just began putting it into his stomach, and in the meanwhile set his assistants to work likewise" (179). If nature speaks, it is through actions rather than words. Nevertheless, Kingsley seems to read its messages as clearly echoing those in the Bible.
Such moral symbolism was countered, however, by displays of apparently wanton natural violence and deceit. In 1856, Kingsley wrote to his friend F. D. Maurice of his disappointment in nature studies:
I have long ago found out how little I can discover about God's absolute love, or absolute righteousness, from a universe in which everything is eternally eating everything else-infinite cunning and shift (in the good sense), infinite creative fancy it does reveal; but nothing else, unless interpreted by moral laws which are in oneself already, and in which one has often to trust against all appearances, and cry out of the lowest deep (as I have had to do) . . . Art thou a "Deus quidam Deceptor," after all?-No. There is something in me-which is not nature, but Thou must have taught me . . . I know that my Redeemer . . . will justify me, and make me right, and deliver me out of the grasp of nature . . . But beetles and zoophytes never whispered that to me. . . . [Nature] can teach no moral theology. It may unteach it, if the roots of moral theology be not already healthy and deep in the mind. I hinted that in "Glaucus."
(1:486, original emphases)
Kingsley's qualification of the phrase "cunning and shift" betrays his anxiety that nature might show creative ingenuity but not a truth-loving God. Glaucus often implies this point by discovering God's "love" in animals' adaptations to their environments. The whelk "burrows in the sand in chase of hapless bivalve shells, whom he bores through with his sharp tongue (always, cunning fellow, close to the hinge, where the fish is), and then sucks out their life" (75). The whelk's amoral "cunning" testifies merely to its practical adaptation to its surroundings. Kingsley similarly avoids moral symbolism when discussing the parasitic sea anemone that rides on a crab's back, stealing its food. The only lesson Kingsley draws here is that "kind Nature" always provides, as it fits the anemone "with a stout leather coat" to shield it when the blundering crab collides with rocks (76). The rhetoric of symbolic moralism gives way to literal utility in the struggle for survival.
Kingsley's anthropomorphic descriptions of sea life paradoxically accentuate nature's amorality. Depicting prey as pitiable victims and predators as devious villains, he highlights nature's injustice in crimes that go unpunished. In one memorable passage, the reader is encouraged to empathize with a fish lethally duped by a camouflaged sea worm. Kingsley's description hovers between the perspectives of naturalist and fish as the worm hangs, helpless and motionless . . . it may be a dead strip of sea-weed, Himanthalia lorea, perhaps, or Chorda filum; or even a tarred string. So thinks the little fish who plays over and over it, till he touches at last what is too surely a head. In an instant a bell-shaped sucker mouth has fastened to his side. In another instant, from one lip, a concave double proboscis . . . has clasped him like a finger; and now begins the struggle: but in vain. (137) The Gothic horror continues as the fish descends into a "cave of doom" (the worm's stomach). The "black murderer" curls up to digest its kill, "motionless and blest," the latter adjective showing Kingsley's effort to preserve some sense of morality (138). He retreats to Paley's view of nature as a system that maximizes happiness, suggesting that he is unable to read any abstract ethics in such phenomena. "This planet was not made for man alone," Kingsley reflects (88). Hence, "if there were . . . final moral causes for their existence, the only ones which we have a right to imagine are these-that all, down to the lowest Rhizopod, might delight themselves, however dimly, in existing; and that the Lord might delight Himself in them" (88-89). Even this claim seems overly optimistic, though, in light of nature's cruel tricks and destruction. Kingsley characterizes life underwater by:
wild flux and confusion, the mad struggles, the despairing cries of the world of spirits which man has defiled by sin, which would at moments crush the naturalist's VICTORIAN STUDIES / VOLUME 58, NO. 1 heart, and make his brain swim with terror, were it not that he can see by faith, through all the abysses and the ages, not merely "Hands,
From out the darkness, shaping man;" but above them a living loving countenance, human and yet Divine. (125) Nature might be empirically "truthful" insofar as its facts were consistent. However, as a model or allegory of moral truthfulness, it often failed to deliver. Faced with this designification of nature, Kingsley salvaged some moral meaning by focusing on the habits of the naturalist. God revealed his love of truth, Kingsley sometimes suggested, less through nature itself than through the providential rise of science, which developed humans' truthfulness. Glaucus depicts the naturalist as rising above the physical world through his bodily self-control. "For his moral character," Kingsley declares, "he must, like a knight of old, be first of all gentle and courteous . . . He should be brave and enterprising" (44). The naturalist "must keep himself free . . . from haste and laziness, from melancholy, testiness, pride, and all the passions which make men see only what they wish to see" (45). Kingsley conflates science's search for factual truths with Christian self-abnegation: both involve transcending the mortal body, subjective feelings, and animal urges. His sentiments conform to a broad, emergent linkage in the period between objectivity and the Christian rejection of bodily self. 9 In 1854, John Tyndall claimed that the scientific practitioner's transcendence of personal feelings and bias rendered him "a heroic, if not indeed an angelic, character" (344). At the same time, phrenology (which greatly interested Kingsley) framed moral improvement as a movement away from "animal" tendencies. As the phrenologist George Combe wrote, "Man has received animal propensities and moral sentiments," the latter separating him from animals (364). Like muscles, morals could be imagined as strengthening with use, and Kingsley frequently advocated science as an exercise to this end. He wrote that the naturalist's habits "of general patience, diligence, accuracy, reverence for facts for their own sake . . . are not merely intellectual, but also moral habits, which will stand men in practical good stead in every affair of life" ("The Study of Natural History" 186). While nature might often be deceitful, studying it could form part of humankind's elevation toward godly truthfulness.
Kingsley frames aesthetically and morally revolting phenomena as moral trials that help naturalists transcend their bodily subjectivities. The shore's "mass of life," he writes, "is somewhat ugly, perhaps, at first sight," strewn with "huge dirty bivalve shells, as large as the hand, each with its loathly grey and black siphons hanging out, a confused mass of slimy death" (62). The naturalist must learn to bear such unpleasantness, however, to appreciate the more abstract beauty of nature's system. In this sense, Kingsley equivocates over whether nature is truly amoral or merely seems so due to humans' fallen state. Camouflage is perhaps an invitation to scrutiny, as Kingsley states of the sea worm:
There are animals in which results so strange, fantastic, even seemingly horrible, are produced, that fallen man may be pardoned, if he shrinks from them in disgust.
That, at least, must be a consequence of our own wrong state; for everything is beautiful and perfect in its place. . . . Whether we are intruding or not in turning this stone, we must pay a fine for having done so, for there lies an animal as foul and monstrous to the eye as "hydra, gorgon, or chimera dire," and yet so wondrously fitted to its work that we must needs endure, for our own instruction, to handle and to look at it. (136) It is not nature that Kingsley describes as "fallen" but humans, whose mortal state distorts their view. Glaucus echoes the sentiment of Proverbs verse 25:2, which offered early Victorians a useful explanation for nature's visual tricks: "It is the glory of God to conceal a thing: but the honour of kings is to search out a matter."
10 Fallen humans might be said to occupy a world of unreliable appearances: to develop the divine truthfulness in themselves, they must seek beneath these appearances. This redemptive, internal process diverts attention from the brutal function of such tricks in nature's economy. Glaucus's rambling narrative form reinforces the focus on the naturalist-narrator scrutinizing his perceptions and, in the process, abstracting from nature by viewing it from a higher, more spiritual altitude. As in Gosse's popular books, the narrative begins not with systematic taxonomies but rather with subjective impressions that the truth-seeker must carefully filter and interrogate. Approaching a bed of shells washed up on the beach, the narrator exclaims: and why are they . . . rattling about the huge mahogany cockles, as big as a child's two fists, out of which they are protruded? (63) (64) Structuring his description as a series of questions and visual metaphors, Kingsley foregrounds problems of perception and perspective. These creatures are, of course, neither razors, squirrels' tails, nor human body parts, but our minds process these unfamiliar objects through comparisons that can mislead. Kingsley urges his readers to gather corallines on the beach, "and think long over them before you determine whether the oat-like stems and spongy roots belong to an animal, or a vegetable. Animals they are, nevertheless, though even now you will hardly guess the fact, when you see at the mouth of each tube a little scarlet flower" (169). Through Kingsley's narration, the reader vicariously experiences the confusion of the naturalist duped by one organism's resemblance to another. He asks: "What is that little brown thing whom you have just taken off the rock to which it adhered so stoutly by his suckingfoot? A limpet? Not at all: he is of quite a different family and structure" (128-29). The sea-snail serves as an object lesson, Kingsley explains, "of the way in which a scientific knowledge of objects must not obey, but run counter to, the impressions of sense" (129). Although nature's deceptions would seem to render it morally meaningless, Kingsley rationalizes them as spurs to humans' innate will to truth, inviting us to dispel nature's tricks and ambiguities with science. While animals might deceive each other, God seems to express his love of truth through the providential rise of science, which allows humans to see through such deceit.
Kingsley further extends this moralization of science in The WaterBabies, suggesting that humans are destined to remodel nature and so render it more truthful. By mastering nature technologically, humans are able to remove or ameliorate its cruel deceits. Nature comes to resemble a physical and moral work in progress that God intends humans to perfect. In the process of this work, they perfect themselves. The protagonist Tom begins life as a devious, blackened chimneysweep, but eventually develops into an honest "great man of science" who "can plan railroads, and steam-engines, and electric telegraphs, and rifled guns" (260). Tom realizes this destiny after he is transformed into a magical "water-baby" who repairs marine environments and safeguards their inhabitants. Victorian aquarium-keepers were often depicted as moral managers, as they prevented fights between sea creatures and obviated predation by feeding them (Hamlin, "Robert Warington" 81) . Tom acts similarly, protecting prey and foiling predators' deadly deceptions. He warns salmon of a "wicked otter" lying in wait for them and tries to protect them from poachers who lure the fish to the surface with bright lights (140). Kingsley was no vegetarian and accepted the necessity of predation in nature's economy, but his vision suggests that predation might at least be made more honest, echoing fox-hunters' justification of their "blood sport" as a fair contest between noble opponents . Kingsley persistently uses imagery of purification to imply that humans are destined to domesticate nature into a cleaner, more transparent form. The tale's claim that "people's souls make their bodies" (171) and not vice-versa presents virtues as supernatural, elevating them above brute nature. Divine truthfulness seems to be located not in material nature but in humans' efforts to rise above and improve it.
The discourse of natural amorality was intensified by Darwin's observations of insects evolving to blend in with their habitats, gradually becoming imperceptible to prey and predators (Origin 84). At the same time, Henry Walter Bates's theory of protective mimicry argued that many insects evolved to trick their enemies by resembling other, inedible species. In April 1863, a month after Macmillan's Magazine published the last installment of The Water-Babies, Kingsley praised Bates's "Mocking butterflies" as evidence of God's design (2:173). Kingsley told Bates that such mimicry "looks most like an immensely long chapter of accidents, and is really, if true, a chapter of special Providences of Him without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground" (2:175). Yet Kingsley's utilitarian rhetoric of design elided the damage such mimicry did to the credibility of natural moral symbolism. As Darwin observed, "Nature condescended to the tricks of the stage" ("Contributions" 220-21). Truthfulness would seem to have no meaning in the beasts' struggle for life.
Amoral Facts and Moral Laws
Locating divine truth in the study of nature instead of its phenomena was problematic for Kingsley's natural theology, as it tended to separate factual truth from moral truth. Such a separation, exemplified in Huxley and Tyndall's agnosticism, would split science and ethics (along with religion) into what Stephen Jay Gould called "non-overlapping magisteria" (19). As Baden Powell wrote in 1860, science answered to "matters of external fact" and religion to matters "internal, moral, and spiritual" (97). Theologians and men of science confused questions of "right or wrong" with "truth or error," Powell concluded, through being "forgetful of their own professions" (100). His comments reflected the growing divergence of the clergy and men of science into separate professional identities produced and trained by different institutions.
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Kingsley's interpretive authority was also challenged by secular evolutionary ethics, which, like deism before it, claimed to find moral laws in nature that replaced those of the Bible. For these reasons, Kingsley continued to seek moral-religious symbolism directly in nature as well as indirectly through science's mastery of nature. His letter to Bates shows him defending his authority to interpret nature as a natural theologian alongside secular naturalists. Having proposed an alternative mechanism of insect mimicry, Kingsley yielded to Bates's rebuttal, stating: "I honestly bow to your superior knowledge." However, Kingsley was also quick to circumscribe this knowledge, explaining:
I have been trying to bring my little logic and metaphysic to bear-not on physical science herself, for she stands on her own ground, microscope in hand, and will allow no intruder, however venerable; but on the nomenclature of physical science, which is to me painfully confused, from a want in our scientific men of that logical training by which things are rightly named, though they cannot be discovered thereby. (2:174) Kingsley argues that although physical science discovers "laws" of nature, these laws are external to its material facts, "the result of a strictly immaterial and spiritual agency" (2:175). While men of science decide the facts that make up nature's laws, Kingsley implies that theologians have the authority to interpret these laws, discovering meanings in them as in a text. Kingsley built on this claim from The Water-Babies onward, as he argued for traces of moral symbolism (particularly promoting truthfulness) in nature's abstract laws.
Kingsley frequently staked his claim for natural moral symbolism in the supposed laws of degeneration. Equating degeneration with immorality, he depicted dishonest behavior as correlative to a low, degraded physical state.
12 The Water-Babies portrays this dynamic through Tom's physical evolution, which symbolizes changes in his morals. At the beginning, Kingsley repeatedly associates Tom with hiding and concealment. As a dirty chimneysweep, his coating of black soot camouflages him in urban environments-much like Darwin's insects. He throws stones at passing horses while ducking behind a wall (6). When he identifies a rich potential client on one such horse, Tom cunningly hides the missile he was about to throw (7) . His master Grimes is similarly associated with deceit and concealment, as he examines clients' grounds for poaching opportunities and hides rabbits in his soot-bag. Kingsley associates this dishonesty with primitive animality. When Tom flees after being mistaken for a thief, the narrator identifies his deviousness with wildness: "Now, Tom was a cunning little fellow-as cunning as an old Exmoor stag. . . . He knew as well as a stag, that if he backed he might throw the hounds out" (28-29). As a water-baby, Tom at first torments aquatic creatures with tricks, putting stones in their mouths. The narrator laments these actions and spurns the excuse that they are natural to boys, for "if they have naughty, low, mischievous tricks in their nature, as monkeys have, that is no reason why they should give way to those tricks like monkeys, who know no better" (72). Kingsley's suggestion that evolutionary regression is the embodiment of divine moral judgment is crystallized in the tale of the Doasyoulikes, who degenerate into apes through their parasitic laziness and egoism. The dishonest and selfish become trapped by their vices and unable to survive without them-not unlike Bates's weak, defenseless species who rely on mimicry to survive. Kingsley further emphasizes the moral, teleological symbolism of evolutionary laws by personifying them in the matriarch Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid. This figure of Mother Nature punishes wrongdoers by relegating them to lower levels of animal existence. All sin will be reckoned with, she explains, through her "machinery" of justice (154), echoing Paley's image of nature as a vast machine. She particularly punishes dishonesty, caning schoolmasters for "telling lies" (158) and making Tom into an echinoderm after he secretly steals from her. Tom's recovery from this degeneration only begins when he confesses his sin, as she explains: "I always forgive every one the moment they tell me the truth of their own accord" (172). Tom's odyssey imports the Broad Church notion of an immanent God who directs history into biological evolution. Kingsley suggests that nature rewards honesty through the rise of civilization and punishes lies through human degeneration into animality.
This dynamic of dishonesty-as-degeneration is particularly pronounced in Kingsley's depiction of the Irish. In 1860, he infamously described impoverished Irish people to his wife as "white chimpanzees" (2:107). His similarly animalistic portrayal of them in The Water-Babies associates such imagined primitivism with mendacity. The narrator refers to Irish people as "gorillas" (147) who "would not learn to be peaceable Christians" (146). Elsewhere, in a digression on rivers, the narrator imagines an Irish servant named Dennis who is incapable of answering questions without lying:
So you must not trust Dennis . . . but, instead of being angry with him, you must remember that he is a poor Paddy, and knows no better . . . [than to] tell you fibs . . . a hundred an hour; and wonder all the while why poor ould Ireland does not prosper like England and Scotland, and some other places, where folk have taken up a ridiculous fancy that honesty is the best policy. (90) (91) Kingsley frames the British colonization of Ireland as truthful civilization policing and improving mendacious primitives.
Kingsley's insistence on the unity of moral and factual truth in nature's laws went hand in hand with insisting on the factuality (however qualified) of scripture. This claim defended his authority as a moral interpreter of nature from the encroachments of scientific naturalists, who instead sought to read nature's moral laws on a secular basis. Herbert Spencer had conceptualized ethics as a material evolution and suggested renaming morality "moral physiology" (58). He thus argued, rather optimistically, that the universal tendency toward truthfulness was shown by the growth of commerce, which relied on increasing trust (397). At the same time, much has been made of Kingsley's correspondence with Huxley in the 1860s, in which the men found common ground in spite of their intellectual differences. 13 Huxley's statements during this exchange sometimes seem to place him in agreement with Kingsley on the universe being morally as well as physically ordered. In 1860, he wrote of his conviction "that the wicked does not flourish nor is the righteous punished. . . . The gravitation of sin to sorrow is as certain as that of the earth to the sun" (1:317). Huxley also echoed Kingsley's prioritizing of veracity, praising the parson's "truthfulness and sincerity" and declaring: "One thing people shall not call me with justice and that is-a liar" (1:319). Yet these comments also illustrate how the rhetoric of natural morality could be secularized. While Kingsley imagined nature echoing biblical morality, Huxley conceived of an agnostic ethics founded on natural laws alone. In 1868, he claimed that nature offered humans an "education" in how to live, stating, "all artificial education ought to be an anticipation of natural education" ("A Liberal Education" 3:85). Like the deists before them, Spencer and Huxley suggested that nature's moral text might be read independently.
Kingsley met this threat to his interpretive authority by presenting nature and the Bible as mutually dependent in their revelations. Each acted as a key to unlock the meaning of the other, he suggested. In this case, his argument was helped by the ambiguity of nature's moral symbolism. In 1863, he wrote in a collection of sermons: "Those whom I have to teach want a living God, who cares for men, forgives men, saves men from their sins:-and him I have found in the Bible, and nowhere else, save in the facts of life, which the Bible alone interprets" (x-xi). Kingsley's argument takes advantage of the past disunity created by natural religion, warning that mere instinctive "religious sentiment," which secularists sought to harness, was "apt (to judge from history) to develop itself into ugly forms . . . into polytheisms, idolatries, witchcrafts, Buddhist asceticisms, Phoenician Moloch-sacrifices, Popish inquisitions, American spirit-rappings" (Gospel xi). Kingsley's examples of religion gone wrong reveal the national, racial, and religious hierarchy implicit in his natural theology. Liberal Anglicanism derives its interpretive authority, Kingsley implies, from its peculiarly British moderation, as it carefully balances traditional belief with recognition of science's discoveries.
While scripture illuminated nature's moral meanings, Kingsley also suggested that science illuminated the facts of scripture. He claimed that the Bible did not conflict with evolution, but was merely vague on such matters. "How God created," he preached, "the Bible does not tell us. Whether he created . . . this world suddenly out of nothing, full grown and complete; or whether he created it . . . out of things which had been before it-that the Bible does not tell us. . . . It is not a book of natural science" (3). Having told F. D. Maurice in the same year of his hope that science and religion would "shake hands at last" (2:181), he presented science and scripture as shading into one another, along with factual and moral truth. The Bible began with "man" and the Earth's creation, Kingsley claimed, because their origins formed the first question of science: "And if man takes up with a wrong answer to that question, then the man himself is certain to go wrong in all manner of ways. For a lie can never do anything but harm, or breed anything but harm" (Gospel 2). Kingsley's language blends scientific and moral truth, describing its opposite not simply as error but as "a lie." Kingsley highlights the factual indefiniteness of scripture and the moral-symbolic indefiniteness of nature to suggest that the two only become fully intelligible when combined.
Yet such efforts to align science and scripture as two parts of a single, moral-physical "truth" did not dispose of more ominous, emerging notions that nature was amoral and that morality itself was an artificial construct. After Kingsley's death, Huxley would renounce his earlier claims for natural moral laws. Ethics, Huxley argued in 1893, emerged not through conformity but via "combat" with the ruthless "cosmic process" ("Evolution and Ethics" 9:81). As early as 1863, Huxley had written to Kingsley of his despair at "the impassable gulf between the anthropomorphism (however refined) of theology and the passionless impersonality of the unknown and unknowable which science shows everywhere underlying the thin veil of phenomena" (1:345). The material universe was, perhaps, not an anthropocentric text but a nexus of mindless, mechanistic processes. Conversely, Darwin's The Descent of Man (1871) argued (to Kingsley's regret) that moral sentiments had developed from the natural selection of groups over individuals.
14 This view had the potential to relativize morals, since survival could depend on such diverse impulses as the fratricide and infanticide Darwin witnessed among bees (1:73). By materializing morality, Darwin prevented it from standing outside of nature's phenomena as a higher, governing law. His work suggested that morality might be meaningful only within the artificial edifice of civilization. In his last years, Kingsley responded to these challenges by dividing the natural world into what he called "the How" and "the Why," representing separate spheres of authority. Yet Kingsley's rhetoric of division paradoxically maintained links between science and theology. In 1863, he had written to Darwin that, although their occupations were different, "Your work, nevertheless, helps mine at every turn. It is better that the division of labour should be complete, and that each man should do only one thing, while he looks on, as he finds time, at what others are doing, and so gets laws from other sciences which he can apply, as I do, to my own" (2:173). Kingsley's politico-economic vocabulary ("division of labour") presents science and natural theology as different points in the single process of pursuing the same unified truth. By 1871, he had developed this division into "the How" and "the Why," telling secular researchers: "you have no business with final causes, because final causes are moral causes, and you are physical students only. We, the natural theologians, have business with them" ("Natural Theology" 329). By insisting that nature had a "Why," he preserved the model in which natural laws signify divine moral values. Simultaneously, by dividing the "moral" from the "physical," he presented the former as proceeding from the latter instead of vice-versa. Beneath the material phenomena of science, he declared, lay an invisible "vital force" (334) that eluded reduction to mechanistic principles and could only be "the Breath of God" (335) .
Yet what morals did God's "Breath" preach? In another lecture of 1871, Kingsley admitted that "Nature's text at first sight" seemed "to say-not the righteous, but the strong shall inherit the land" (174). The world appeared ruled by "selfish competition, over-reaching tyranny, the temper which fawns and clings, and plays the parasite as long as it is down" ("Bio-Geology" 175). Nonetheless, he demanded, "is this all which the facts mean?" The law of "mutual competition," he claimed, was offset by "a law of mutual help," as every organism relied on others to feed and protect it, however unconsciously (175). Hence, "self-sacrifice, and not selfishness, is at the bottom the law of Nature . . . as it is the law of all religion and virtue worthy of the name" (176). Just as many Victorians assumed that the Old Testament prefigured the New, Kingsley presents nature as symbolically prefiguring the morality that scripture would crystallize. His rhetoric of moral symbolism frames theology's textual interpretation and science's empirical observation as complementary methods. While science reveals nature's hieroglyphs, only the theologian can glimpse moral meaning in them.
Kingsley recognized that such meanings were often unclear and questionable, like many textual interpretations. In 1870, he wrote to the geologist William Pengelly: "'Life is certain,' say I, because God is educating us thereby. But this process of education is so far above our sight, that it looks often uncertain and utterly lawless" (2:318). Yet, no matter how inscrutable nature seemed, Kingsley always persisted in his faith that higher, moral meanings lay behind it. His ability to maintain this faith derived less from his vacillating circles of logic than from his emotional attachment to a personal God who was as preoccupied with truthfulness as Kingsley was. It was his deeply held conviction that God could not lie that enabled Kingsley to look forward so optimistically to a future in which science and scripture would agree fully. Two years before Kingsley's death, Friedrich Nietzsche wrote of truth and lies "in a Nonmoral Sense"-but Kingsley would have rejected this subject as a contradiction in terms. To concede the possibility of non-moral knowledge would be to invalidate his authority as an interpreter of nature. His example illustrates how, in Victorian culture, the conflation and separation of factual and moral truth were bound up with institutional and disciplinary struggles for authority.
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